Civil Society Vis-a-vis Human Rights And World Peace

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The universal declaration of human rights in its preamble stresses the equality and inalienability of human rights, equal freedom to all human beings, protection of human rights by the rule of law, equal rights of men and women to equally participate in social progress and achieve better standards of life in larger freedom, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedom. In the light of this preamble I shall discuss human rights and how they are linked up with world peace.

Human rights and world peace get born of the human need to grow richer and richer. In the absence of one the other carries no meaning. We shall have to feature world peace in our discussion on human rights. There is still another factor that also contributes to establishing world peace; the factor is security. Thus, human rights, world peace and security are intimately interrelated.

Civil Society that functions outside of the family and state should work for orienting the minds of the people of the world to adhering to the principle of human rights to usher in world peace.

In a democratic set-up civil society plays a dominant role and this role is in many respects oriented to maintaining world peace through respecting human rights and alleviating poverty as much as possible. It is not possible to drive out poverty completely in the foreseeable future. I say this because it is not possible to drive out or eradicate poverty until wealth is equally distributed. But it is not impossible for civil society to alleviate poverty to a considerable extent by orienting itself to the urgent need of fostering world peace and advocating human rights. The poor, the underprivileged and the downtrodden are entitled to enjoy human rights as are the rich and the privileged. This theory, this concept is not difficult to materialize if civil society cares to work on it and make people awake and rise.

This paper aims to show how civil society is linked to human rights and world peace.

But two pertinent question are likely to crop up in the minds of the readers who have just heard of Civil Society and have not bothered about it: What is civil society and how is it linked to human rights and world peace.

Here I shall attempt to interpret civil society from a historical perspective. Before doing this, we had rather get to know what we should understand by civil society.

By civil society is meant the arena that functions outside of the family, the state, and the market where people gather together to promote and further common interests and often includes the family and the private sphere. It is often referred to as the "third sector" of society, thus distinguishing itself from government and business. The third sector is a generic term used to
refer to a community sector that encompasses mom-profit and voluntary organizations, cooperatives and faith groups. The article on a website I am solely relying upon to write on civil society cites Dictionary.com's 21st Century Lexicon defining ‘civil society as 1) the aggregate of non-governmental organizations and institutions that manifest interests and will of citizens or 2) individuals and organizations in a society which are independent of the government.’ Collins English Dictionary uses the term to refer to "the elements such as freedom of speech, an independent judiciary, etc, that make up a democratic society" The term intruded into public discourse in the United States in the 1980s. Its tradition is much richer and longstanding, though.

Since I have not set out to deal with civil society in detail but aim to show how it is linked to human rights and world peace, we need to satisfy ourselves by getting to know how civil society has developed out of the pre-modern classical republican understanding. It is not possible, every thinker dealing with civil society will admit, to tell with surety when and how this term originated.

However, the concept of civil society in the pre-modern classical republican understanding owes itself to the early modern thought of Age of Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. But older is its history in the realm of political thought. In general sense civil society has been conceived of as a political association that settles social conflicts by imposing rules meant to prevent citizens harming their fellow-beings. In the classical period the concept was thought of as synonymous with the good society and the political concept in this period lays importance on the idea of a ‘good society’ which consists in establishing peace among the people.

In the Middle Ages the concept of civil society suffered a drastic change, The unique political arrangements of feudalism explain why the concept of classical civil society disappeared from mainstream discussion. The classical concept then had to limit itself to discussion on problems of just war, a preoccupation that persisted to the end of Renaissance.

The Thirty Years’ War and the subsequent Treaty of Westphalia birthed the sovereign states system, The Treaty upheld and advocated the right of states to exercise sovereignty as territorially-based political units and thanks to this endorsement the monarchs found themselves empowered to exercise domestic control, financially, politically and militarily. This gave rise to absolutism.

But the absolutist nature of the state was exposed to a challenge in the Enlightenment period. Confronted with a natural consequence of Renaissance, Humanism and the scientific revolution as they were, the Enlightenment thinkers raised such fundamental questions as ‘What legitimacy does heredity confer?’, ‘Why are governments constituted?’, ‘Why should some human beings have more basic rights than others?’ and so on.

The proposition ‘Why should some human beings have more basic rights than others?’ has elongated in course of time into the global concepts of human rights and world peace which can be achieved through fulfilment of basic human needs.

Human rights and world peace that grow out of fulfilment of basic human needs are quite related to each other and nourish and nurture themselves on the human need to grow richer and richer. In the absence of one the other carries no meaning. We shall have to feature world peace in our discussion on human rights, There is still another factor that also contributes its share to establishing world peace; the factor is security. Thus these three factors, human rights, world peace and security are interrelated to one another. Another essential factor dominates these three
factors and take it from around them, they will be reduced to nothingness. The essential factor is not difficult to surmise at. This factor is poverty. I shall come round to it in due course.

Now let us talk about how world peace and human rights are linked to each other, security dominating the two. Abolition of poverty is an important factor that governs their interlinking. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize is the most prestigious recognition to the recipients for their services to world peace. The list of Nobel peace laureates, including, to name a few, Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991 and Rigoberta Menchu in 1992 testifies to a clear acknowledgment of the link between world peace and human rights. Many political leaders in different countries have acquiesced in the importance of security in maintaining the equilibrium between world peace and human rights and have developed a conception of security. Scholarship, too, has attempted to broaden and deepen the conception of security. Security studies which often tends to ignore the normative questions linked to the control, threat and use of organized violence rests on shallow foundation and, thus, stands isolated from its central question of its legitimization.

An example that deserves to be cited in this context is of the trend to wed the normative enquiries to strategic studies and this example is the revived interest in the proposition that democracies do not wage war against one another, but promote human rights better than alternative regimes. These two propositions put together propel one to the view that democratization can lead simultaneously to an enhancement of human rights and peacefulness of the world. World peace researchers might be interested by a concern with human rights, because it can lead to violent conflict in one or all of the ways mentioned. The groups who find their rights abused resort to arms in retaliation and the conflict can spread far and wide to entangle neighbouring countries. The scale of human rights abuses can involve other countries in the form of interference.

The most important intergovernmental organization (IGO) assigned with the responsibility for maintaining world peace is the United Nations (UN). Its peace-keeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988. But it has not had any record to show that the awarding of the most coveted prize helped defend human rights. The best known non-governmental organization (NGO) in the field of human rights is Amnesty International (AI), itself a former recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize (1977). I have mentioned in this paper two organizations, one intergovernmental and the other non-governmental, because these two organizations work together in the area of human rights.

What do we understand by human rights? Ask every educated man what a right means and he will certainly say it means a claim. This clear-cut answer establishes the fact that a right lies in the domain of entitlements. We are certainly entitled to certain rights. No one gives or denies it to us. I have the right to inhale air; no one has given me this right and can deny me this right. As I was born into this world that belongs to nobody, I have the right to live peacefully and I can live peacefully so long as I shall refrain from infringing upon my neighbours’ rights. But right should not be construed as demand. As distinct from a demand, a right is justified and legitimate. A right is a claim against some entity or person. A theory of rights can be postulated alongside the doctrine of logical correlativity which means the association of the rights of one person with the duties of another, as against the doctrine of moral correlativity which holds that with a view to enjoying rights one must needs be able to perform reciprocal obligations. There have emerged two groups who interpret human rights in the ways opposed to each other. One group – they are legal positivists - put forward the view that true rights are those which are set out and enforceable in law. The other group lay stress on the moral aspect of rights which can be recognized by enlightened conscience.
We know human beings do not inhabit a universe of shared moral values and different communities nurture and nourish different and independent moral values. Different and diverse communities cohabit or live together in international society. Article 16(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims the right to marriage, subject to the free and full consent of the intending spouses, this clause, it should be mentioned in this context, conflicts with the wide-spread practice of arranged marriage which many societies are known to regard perfectly consistent with their moral system. Political rights (freedoms of speech, press and assembly; political and legal equality) are rights held by the individual against the state. By contrast socialist regimes regard human rights from the perspective of their own responsibilities, which means they take it upon themselves to secure the benefits of their people and collective groups, that is, workers, individuals etc. owe their obligations to the societies they live in. The nation of individual human rights lays open a subset of the larger dilemma of tracking down justification outside particular frameworks, In many societies, the individual as a person is regarded as a social construct: individual beliefs, religions, world-views, language, gestures, and mores are all moulded by society and culture. In Marxist ideology rights, emerge historically as they do, point to class-relationship and individual human rights are, as this theory gives us to understand, but reflections of the class interests of the bourgeoisie. By contrast, collective rights are the foundation of human rights and they are preconditions for all individuals to enjoy rights and freedoms equally. They are not, however, abstract ideals; they are expressed concretely in specific laws of various countries. They therefore cannot be understood apart from the laws and the institutions of a country. Differences in national rights speak of the different conceptions of human rights practiced in different countries and there is no universal right evolved to override national laws.

There has imperceptibly cropped up a difference between Western and non-Western concepts of human rights, as was evident at the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993. At this historic conference were stressed by several official delegations cultural and value differences between Asia and the West. The foreign minister of Singapore voiced a warning – Amartya Sen has quoted this warning in his book, 'Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny' published 2006 by Allen Lane in collaboration with Penguin Books, on page 94 – that ‘universal recognition of the ideal of human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or mask the reality of diversity.’ The Chinese delegations played a significant role in laying a particular emphasis on regional differences and in ensuring that the prescriptive framework adopted in the declarations made room for regional diversity. ‘The Chinese foreign minister,’ as says Amartya San. ‘put on record the proposition that the Asian priorities demand’ that the states’ rights must precede individuals’ rights.

As is seen in the proceedings of the above world conference on human rights, many Asian exponents of human rights have engaged themselves in championing Asian values particularly in reaction to the Western claim to be depository of ideas on liberty and rights. Ironically, there are many proponents of the excellence of Asian values who do not dispute this claim and rather choose to argue that while Europe may have been the home ground of liberty and individual rights, Asian values hold dear discipline and order, and they aver the priority of discipline and order over liberty and rights. The West can keep its individual liberties and rights but Asia can do better by adhering to orderly conduct and disciplined behaviour.

Support for liberty and human rights has been articulated no less often in Asia – India, China, Japan and in various other countries in East, Southeast, South and West Asia – than in Europe. The point to note here is not just the debatable nature of the diagnosis of Asian values and its
seriously underestimating the range and reach of the intellectual heritage of Asia, but the thoroughly reactive nature of the genesis of this view.

The outcome of the world conference on human rights shed a very dim light on the resistance to Westernization in the world today. This resistance often assumes the form of ideas that are considered Western, despite the fact that these ideas have occurred and flourished historically in many non-Western countries and have gradually become a part of our global past. There is nothing absolutely Western about valuing liberty and defending public reasoning. Their being labeled ‘Western’ is likely to produce a negative attitude towards them in other societies.

Part of the reason for this fixation with the West, or the alleged West lies in the history of colonialism. Western imperialism, in addition to submerging, over the last few centuries, the political independence of the countries ruled or dominated by the colonial powers, created attitudinal climate which is, in the words of Amartya Sen, ‘obsessed with the West, even though the form of that obsession may vary widely – from slavish imitation on one side, to resolute hostility on the other.’ (Identity and Violence, P. 84) It is also important to take cognizance of the fact that serious abuses occurred and the social memory enshrined in prose and poetry of those actual of those actual transgressions still enlivens anti-Western attitudes today. It is worth quoting in this context Amartya Sen as saying, reference Chapter 5 of his book, ‘Identity and Violence’, ‘Now that a warm nostalgia for the empires of yesterday – for the British in particular – seems to be making something of a comeback in Europe (and oddly enough, even in America), it is worth remembering that the perceived sense of colonial inequity was not entirely baseless.’ (P. 85)

The role of colonial humiliation in the dialectics of the dominated people, as says Amartya Sen, calls forth at least as much attention as the influence of economic and political asymmetry imposed by the imperial authorities.

In Pilgrim’s Progress. John Bunyan depicts ‘the valley of humiliation. Bunyan possessed personal experience of humiliation because of his having spent many years in prison. The fact is that he began wring ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’ during his second spell of his imprisonment in the sixteen-seventies, the book being published in 1678. The harrowingness of the image of that imagined valley pales into insignificance before the image of indignity and humiliation already suffered by Africa in Bunyan’s seventeenth century world. Africa which pioneered in many developments in the growth of world civilization was beginning to be turned into a continent of European domination and a hunting ground for slaves to be transported like animals to the New World.

There is no scope for exaggerating the effects of humiliation on human lives, when we read of the evils associated with slave trade and colonization which have been seen as ‘wars against Africa,’ by the Independent Commission which is chaired by Albert Tevoedjre, the commission identifying African principal task as winning the war against humiliation. In the words of Amartya Sen, as ‘commission argues, the subjugation and denigration of Africa over the last few centuries have left a massively negative legacy against which the people of the continent have to battle.’ (Identity and Violence; P. 87)

I have already walked far beyond the boundary and should restrain myself walking farther. How human rights are being trampled underfoot is not within the purview of my present discussion. World peace will never be achieved if we do not respect human dignity. Poverty destroys human dignity and peace. Poverty always cowers under the stare of wealth and peace never befriends poverty but plays into the hands of wealth. Human rights loves eluding the grasp of the poor and downtrodden. People in poverty should know how poverty is depriving them of their rights as
human beings and how it is capitalized upon to make them servile. In order to understand how they are being deprived by poverty, they must acquaint themselves with the concept of poverty.

As we all know human poverty is linked to human needs and fulfillment of common human needs is a prelude to world peace.

How we can define poverty is of the essence to political, policy and academic debates on the concepts and bound up with explanations, involving value judgment. Definition, thus, has to be understood as a political and social scientific act. Controversy often arises over different definitions postulated; no one has arrived at any definition acceptable to all dealing with poverty. Most researchers have more or less acquiesced in the fact that any definition they want to adopt should be understood, at least in part, in relation to particular social, cultural and historical contexts. Definitions vary according to its narrowness or breadth. We should construct definitions in terms of whether they are confined to the material core, or rather to the nature of the material core, and whether they subsume, at the same time, relational or symbolic factors involved with poverty. It should be borne in mind that any concept of poverty stands within history and culture and is but a construction of specific sources, and different groups within a society may construct it in different ways. Owing to the moral imperative of poverty and its implications for the distribution of resources both within and between societies, it is also a political concept. Many researchers direct a definition towards the narrower end of the scale on the grounds that too broad a definition is likely to run the risk of losing the distinctive core notion of poverty, and define poverty in terms of the inability on the part of people in poverty to participate in society owing to lack of resources. They ignore, in their seeking for a plausible definition, non-material elements such as lack of participation in decision-making, a violation of human dignity, powerlessness and susceptibility to violence. They also do not take into their consideration some of non-material aspects people in poverty themselves grieve over, such as, lack of voice, respect, self-esteem, isolation and humiliation. Assuming that the function of a definition is to draw a clear distinction between the condition defined (poverty) and other conditions (bon-poverty) we can pitch the definition of poverty towards the narrower end of the spectrum. ‘Lack of participation in decision-making’, ‘susceptibility to violence’ and ‘humiliation’ and such other aspects no doubt characterize poverty, but they are also associated with other condition, such as being ‘Black in the White-dominated society. It is important for us, however, to conceive of poverty as not divorced from wider conceptualization, lest we should lose sight of the wider meanings of poverty and of the interpretation of the material and relational or the symbolic sight of.

Another source of variation in definitions of poverty reside in whether they lie entrenched or rooted in conceptualizations concerned, on one hand, with a person’s material resources including income in especial, and, on the other, with actual outcomes in terms of living standards and activities. In practice these two approaches are often treated as complimentary to each other. To avoid the confusion owing to the overlay of the two approaches, a distinction is thought of between a concern with standard of living and a concern with a person’s, nay, a citizen’s right to a minimum level of resources. The former is much used in literature, whereas the latter might be sought in measures of poverty based on the numbers that fall below a certain point in the income scale or income provided a social assistance scheme has been adopted by a country. This particular point will be touched in some detail when my discussion rivets itself on measuring of poverty. Even though the right to a minimum level of resources has not been widely used as a definition of poverty, it can’t be denied a value it implicitly contains as an
element in a broader conceptualization of poverty. It is open to question whether this definition of poverty holds as good in India or in the Indian subcontinent, for it means that people ‘are entitled, as citizens, to a minimum income, the disposal of which is a matter for them.’ (Poverty, P.14)

The conceptualization of poverty becomes to some extent easy and helpful if we consider it from the perspective of understanding and combating women’s poverty. Ruth Lister draws upon Stephen Jenkins in her “Poverty Measurement and the Within-Household Distribution (Journal of Social Policy, 20(4), 464) to suggest ‘that a feminist concept of poverty can be described in terms of an “individual right to a minimum level of potential economic independence”’ (Poverty, P 15). She also goes on to say that although ‘the feminist definition propounded by Millar and Glendinning is not couched in the language of rights, it focuses on the individual’s capacity to be self-supporting on the grounds that “people who are financially dependent upon others must be considered vulnerable to poverty”’(P15). The notion of vulnerability will help us in understanding the situation of women without an independent income.

In the above part of discussion I have attempted an approach to defining poverty in terms of an inability to participate in society, involving both low income and a low standard of living. It should be noted in this connexion that the work of the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen suggests an alternative on the role of low income in the definition of poverty which has found its way into the international development programme by contributing to a paradigm shift in the meaning of development away from economic growth and gross domestic product (GDP) to a focus, to quote United Nations Development Programme (Poverty, P 15, on ‘poverty as a denial of choices and opportunities for living a tolerable life.’ ‘Although its initial impact on thinking and research about poverty in the North was less marked.’, says Ruth Lister in her book Poverty on page 15, ‘increasingly Sen’s ideas are percolating through’. His research offers insights that are helpful to poverty’s broader conceptualization in the North.’ I shall bring up Amartya Sen in the Indian context of poverty. But let us hear what Amartya Sen says apropos of poverty via Ruth Lister.. The work of Amartya Sen, says Ruth Lister, throws light on the absolute-relative question Sen seeks to answer himself.

Sen takes a step backwards from both income and living standards to ask why they matter. His answer is that they don’t matter in their own right, for they are simply instrumental to what really matters, namely the kind of life that a person is able to lead and the choices and opportunities open to her in leading that life. At the heart of his approach is an understanding of living as involving ‘being and doing.’ (P 15)

Amartya Sen uses two key terms to give expression to this idea: ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’. Functionings refer to what a person manages to do or be, ranging, as they do, from elementary nourishment upwards to such sophisticated levels as participation in the life of the community and the achievement of self-respect. ‘Capabilities’ speak of what a person can do or be; it means the range of choice open to people to choose between different ways of living they can have reason to value.

Money, Ruth Lister informs us Amartya Sen argues, is not a means to an end and the goods and services and its buying of commodities is one of many ways of achieving functionings. The role of money in achieving functionings depends upon the extent to which they are commodified goods and services and, thus, will vary between societies. Besides the relationships between money and capabilities or functionings depend in part upon how individuals convert the former into the
latter. This can vary according to personal factors such as age, sex, pregnancy, health, disability or even metabolic rate or body size, which can work on the level and nature of personal needs. An instance may be cited to bring this point home. The capability of a disabled person to function may be lower than that of a non-disabled person, even if the former’s income is higher than that of the latter. This is because of the fact that the costs are associated with the additional needs that disabled people feel sort of compelled to meet with a view to achieving similar functionings to the non-disabled. Amartya Sen argues for poverty to be defined in terms of capability failure, that is, the failure of basic capabilities to reach certain minimally acceptable level.

We come across two main planks to the case Amartya Sen makes in opposition to defining poverty in terms of low income or material resources. There are some theoreticians on poverty like Nolan and Whetan who address the narrower one concerning the differences in the ability on the part of people to convert income into capabilities, and point out that it is possible to take account of such inter-personal factors in the setting of income poverty lines. However, they conclude, on the basis of their own research, that interpersonal variation is so pronounced it poses a major problem to arriving at a distinct definition of poverty. Moreover, there remains a danger to laying too great an emphasis on physical factors, inasmuch as, laying of too great an emphasis has a possibility to affect the conversion of income into capabilities and encourage a narrow focus to be placed on their physical needs and their physiological rather than social construction.

The more fundamental plank relates to the relationship between low income and a person’s ability to live the kind of life she or he values. According to Amartya Sen, income is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. It focuses on the individual and, thus, renders gender inequalities more easily visible. It also ‘constructs human beings as people with agency for whom the freedom to be able to make choices about what they want to be and do and about how they deploy the resources available to them is of fundamental importance.’ (Poverty, P. 17)

Since, as Amartya Sen points out, income is a means, not an end in itself, we should not lose sight of the symbolic and actual significance of money – and lack of it – in commodified, wage-based societies. ‘As Karl Marx understood, money may be instrumental but it is also inseparable from the power that it confers: “I can carry [money] around with me in my pocket as the universal social power...Money puts social power into the hands of the private person who as such uses this power.”’ (Poverty, P. 19)

We have, I think, understood a bit how Amartya Sen tries to define poverty. Before passing on to discussion on western and eastern concepts of poverty, we must needs go beyond the absolute-relative dichotomy with a view to an understanding of the concept of poverty and hope that the reader will bear with me for a short while.

The distinction between absolute and relative poverty is of central importance to post-war debates as to how poverty is to be defined. ‘Definitions deployed in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century by Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree, the pioneers of modern poverty research, were supposedly “absolute” in the sense that poverty is said to be understood as lacking sufficient money to meet basic physical needs.’ (Poverty, PP 20-21) Absolute poverty, defined at its most basic, in terms of survival, more commonly pertains to substance linked, as it is, to a basic standard of physical production essential to the production (paid work) and reproduction (the bearing and nurturing of children). Nutrition dominates such definition. An ‘absolute standard means one defined by reference,’ Ruth Lister quotes Joseph and Sumpton in
‘Equality’, London, edited by John Murray, as saying, ‘to the actual needs of the poor and not by reference to expenditure of those who are not poor. A family is poor if he cannot afford to eat,’ ((Poverty, P.21).

There is implicit in this statement a rejection of the alternative relative definition, ‘developed by Townsend and articulated most fully in his monumental “Poverty in the United Kingdom.”’ (Poverty, P.21). Townsend disapproves the narrow subsistence notion of needs which are divorced from their social context, upon which were based absolute definitions of poverty. Ruth Lister quotes on page 21, his definition as below:

Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individuals or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns and activities. (Poverty in the United Kingdom, 1979, Penguin Books)

Ruth Lister goes on to refer to the European Commission’s definition of poverty which, adopted in 1984, sounds similar in tone, ‘The poor shall be taken,’ she quotes the European Commission on page 21, ‘to mean persons, families and groups of persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State in which they live.” As opposed to Townsend’s, though, the definition articulated by the European Commission does not particularize explicitly the dimension of participation, key to the concept of relative deprivation upon which is built Townsend’s definition of poverty. Relative deprivation occurs only when people fail to obtain, at all or sufficiently such conditions of life as enable them to play the roles assigned to them, to participate in the relationships and follow the customary behaviour expected of them thanks to their membership of society. The condition of life referred to are: diets, amenities, standards and services.

We shall now touch in brief on understanding of needs, then attempt a reconciliation of absolute and relative definitions. After that we shall pass on to discussion on the eastern and western concepts of poverty.

A particular understanding of human needs underlies the various comparative dimensions of the notion of relative poverty. How needs are understood are central both to the absolute-relative poverty dichotomy and to the ways in which debate has moved beyond the dichotomy. John Veit-Wilson, a human rights activist suggests a helpful definition of human needs that stresses the social and psychological, as in the following passage, quoted by Ruth Lister (Poverty, P.24). I shall conclude this paper by quoting his statement:

The full range of intangible and material resources that are required over time to achieve the production, maintenance and reproduction of the fully autonomous, fully participating adult human in the particular society to which he or she belongs… Material resources may support the physical organism but it is the full range of social and psychological resources which are required for the experience of humanity.


It is time Civil Society, besides working for orienting the minds of the people to adhering to the principle of human rights to usher in world peace, took up the gauntlet against those violating this principle.